Most empirical and theoretical econometric studies of dynamic discrete choice models assume the discount factor to be known. We show the knowledge of the discount factor is not necessary to identify parts, or all, of the payo¤ function. We show the discount factor can be generically identi…ed jointly with the payo¤ parameters. It is known the payo¤ function cannot nonparametrically identi…ed without any a priori restrictions. Our identi…cation of the discount factor is robust to any normalization choice on the payo¤ parameters. In IO applications normalizations are usually made on switching costs, such as entry costs and scrap values. We also show that switching costs can be nonparametrically identi…ed, in closed-form, independently of the discount factor and other parts of the payo¤ function. Our identi…cation strategies are constructive. They lead to easy to compute estimands that are global solutions. We illustrate with a Monte Carlo study and the dataset from Ryan (2012). JEL Classification Numbers: C14, C25, C51
Introduction
The stationary dynamic discrete decision model surveyed in Rust (1994) has been a subject of much research in econometric theory and empirical studies. The primitives of the model consist of the period payo¤ function, Markov transition law, and discount factor. A well-known characteristic of a dynamic decision model is that it is not identi…ed. For example, Manski (1983) points out in general that the discount factor and payo¤ function cannot be jointly identi…ed nonparametrically.
Most positive identi…cation results in the literature until recently focus on identifying payo¤ parameters while assuming other primitives to be known; e.g. see Magnac and Thesmar (2002) , and also Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) and Bajari et al. (2009) . Meanwhile an empirical work typically parameterizes the payo¤ function, parameterizes at least part of the distribution of the variables, and assumes the discount factor to be known.
In this paper we are interested in identifying the discount factor jointly with the payo¤ function under the linear-in-parameter speci…cation. This parametric model is the most commonly used speci…cation in practice. When there are …nite states the linear speci…cation can represent any nonparametric function. Most empirical studies assume the value of the discount factor to be known without any formal justi…cation. To the best of our knowledge we are not aware of any prior iden-ti…cation study involving the discount factor in a general parametric model. We provide conditions under which both the discount factor and payo¤ parameters can be identi…ed, and propose an easy to compute estimator for them. Other positive identi…cation of the discount factor in the literature use a nonparametric approach. They use exclusion restrictions in the form of variables a¤ecting future utilities but not current utilities to identify the discount factor; see Dubé et al. (2014) , Wang (2014) , Fang and Wang (2015) , and Ching and Osborne (2017) . We do not rely on these assumptions.
A nonparametric payo¤ function without any restriction cannot be identi…ed even if the discount factor is known. The fundamental identi…cation characteristic in a discrete choice model can be traced to the static random utility model of McFadden (1974) , where utility is ordinal and its level cannot be identi…ed. Some form of normalization has to be made. Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014, AS hereafter) recently highlight the undesirable e¤ects that an arbitrary normalization have on un-normalized parameters and counterfactual studies, and emphasize the importance of identi…able objects without any normalization; also see Kaloupsidi et al. (2016a Kaloupsidi et al. ( , 2016b ). An important question then is whether our identi…cation result is robust to misspecifying the normalization choice.
We verify that our identi…cation of the discount factor is robust against any normalization choice.
The payo¤ parameters are not robust, but some of their meaningful combinations are. To this end we also contribute to the literature by providing a nonparametric framework to identify the payo¤ parameters that arise from changing in the actions of players between time periods. We call these switching costs 1 . For example, in an entry/exit model, they are entry cost and scrap value.
Individually the entry cost and scrap value cannot be separately identi…ed but their di¤erence, the sunk entry cost, can be identi…ed. We show that switching costs can be written explicitly in terms of the observed choice probabilities, independently of the discount factor as well as other (non switching costs) components of the payo¤ function. AS has already shown the sunk entry costs in several IO models can be identi…ed in this fashion. We extend these results to sunk investment costs that can arise from …rm investing and divesting, as well as individual switching costs themselves under other a priori restrictions.
A general discussion on the non-identi…cation of the a dynamic model we consider can be found in Rust (1994) . Positive identi…cation is possible when more structures are imposed on the primitives. Magnac and Thesmar (2002) have shown the problem of identifying the payo¤ parameters nonparametrically when all other primitives of the model are assumed to be known can be reduced to a study of solutions to a linear system; also see Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) and Bajari et al. (2009) . We are interested in the payo¤ parameters as well as the discount factor. The discount factor enters the decision problem recursively and thereby introduces nonlinearity in the model. Magnac and Thesmar (2002, Section 4.2) suggest that exclusion or parametric restrictions can be used to identify the discount factor. For the former, their Proposition 4 illustrates in a simple two-period model the discount factor is in fact typically overidenti…ed. The identifying restriction is that: for some states utilities in the …rst period are the same but di¤er in the second period.
This idea has been elaborated, and applied in di¤erent empirical contexts, by Dube et al. (2014) , Wang (2014) , Fang and Wang (2015) , and Ching and Osborne (2017) amongst others. On the other hand, while it may be plausible to assume identi…cation is possible in a parametric model we are not aware of any theoretical result that has veri…ed this to be true. In particular establishing parametric identi…cation in a general nonlinear model is a non-trivial task; see Komunjer (2012) for a recent illustration. We prove identi…cation using a pseudo-model that is linear in the payo¤ parameters conditioning on the discount factor. We construct a one-dimensional criterion function to be used for identi…cation. It exploits the conditional linear structure to pro…le out the payo¤ parameters and reduce the nonlinear nature of the problem to just one dimension. The criterion function we construct to establish identi…cation has a sample counterpart that can be used for estimation.
In many IO applications, switching costs are often the essence of a dynamic decision problem and can even be the central object of the dynamic model itself (e.g. see Slade (1998) , and also the general discussions in Ackerberg et al. (2007) and Pesendorfer (2010) ). Our study on the switching costs takes 1 We use the term switching costs that shares the same spirit as generic adjustment costs and other inertia. Examples of usages in various …elds of economics and marketing include the cost to change in health insurance plan, changing of credit and other utility providers, and retailer's decisions on promotions. a nonparametric approach. We identify combinations of the switching costs by exploiting empirically motivated exclusion and testable independence assumptions. A key step involves eliminating common future expected discounted payo¤s that arise from di¤erent states. Our result does not depend on the discount factor and some other components of the payo¤ function. The robust identi…cation of this nature has precedence in the literature but has not been highlighted. 2 For example, an inspection of Proposition 2 in Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014) will reveal that the same implication of our Theorem 2 has already been obtained for a binary action game of entry/exit 3 . We provide closedform expressions for switching costs and their combinations in terms of only the observed choice probabilities. They can therefore be trivially estimated. They also suggest overidenti…cation test can be constructed by comparing against other estimates of switching costs obtained under additional assumptions on the model primitives.
Throughout the paper our identi…cation results are obtained using a pseudo-model under the assumption that the choice and transition probabilities are nonparametrically identi…ed. These same probabilities are used to compute expected payo¤s in a pseudo-decision problem for all values of the model parameters as opposed to the actual (full-solution) model where equilibrium probabilities are used. The pseudo-model is used because it is tractable. Indeed a pseudo-model is the basis for any two-step estimation procedures, following Hotz and Miller (1993) , that are preferred on computational grounds over the full-solution nested …xed-point algorithm of Rust (1987) . The estimator we propose in this paper will be based on the two-step approach of Sanches et al. (2016) with computational simplicity in mind. It is worth noting that, although consistent, a simple two-step estimator like ours tend to have larger …nite sample bias and is less e¢ cient than estimators that enforce the equilibrium restriction of the model. Equilibrium constraints can be imposed during estimation with additional computational cost, also without the need to solve out a dynamic optimization problem (cf. Rust (1987) ). E.g. Mira (2002, 2007) and Egesdal, Lai and Su (2015) have shown the fully e¢ cient maximum likelihood estimator can be obtained in this way.
When the data come from a single time series, or when they are pooled across short panels of multiple homogeneous markets, the choice and transition probabilities are nonparametrically iden-ti…ed under weak conditions. In practice many datasets are short panels, where it would be more reasonable to assume some form of unobserved heterogeneity exists across markets. A ‡exible yet tractable way to model unobserved heterogeneity in this literature is to use a …nite mixture model. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) suggest economic agents' payo¤s have time-invariant 2 In one instance, for a slightly di¤erent model with a mixed continuous-discrete decision variable, Hong and Shum (2010) rely on a deterministic state transition rule to de…ne a pairwise-di¤ erence estimator that matches on, and thereby avoid computing, future expected discounted payo¤s from di¤erent states. 3 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.
For example
unobserved market speci…c component that is unobserved to the econometrician, therefore markets of di¤erent types have di¤erent equilibrium distributions on the observables. Kasahara and Shimotsu (2009) and Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) have given conditions so that the probabilities for each mixture type can be nonparametrically identi…ed under di¤erent frameworks, thereby extending the scope of applying two-step estimation methods to models with unobserved heterogeneity. All iden-ti…cation results in our paper are valid in such setting as long as we can identify the type speci…c probabilities to be able to set up the corresponding pseudo-decision problem. Speci…cally the degree of overidenti…cation on the model primitives increases proportionally to the number of mixture types.
The class of decision problems we consider is a special case of dynamic games described in Aguirregabiria and Nevo (2010) and Bajari, Hong and Nekipelov (2010) . All of our intuition and results are applicable to these games. The most parts of this paper focus on the single agent model for notational simplicity and clarity of idea, and to abstract ourselves away from game speci…c issues (such as multiple equilibria). For the same reasoning given for models with unobserved heterogeneity, the portability of our results to dynamic games is immediate as long as the choice and transition probabilities can be consistently estimated nonparametrically. The numerical studies of our proposed estimators are in fact performed in a dynamic game setting. The details on extending our single agent's results to games can be found in the Appendix.
We perform a Monte Carlo study of our proposed estimators using the simulation design in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008). We then use the dataset from Ryan (2012) to estimate a dynamic game played between …rms in the US Portland cement industry. In our version of the game, …rms choose whether to enter the market as well as decide on the capacity level of operation (…ve di¤erent levels). We assume …rms compete in a capacity constrained Cournot game, so the period pro…t can be estimated directly from the data as done in Ryan. The primitives we estimate are the discount factor, …xed operating cost, and 25 switching cost parameters. We estimate the model twice. Once using the data from before 1990, and once after 1990, which coincides with the date of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (1990 CAAA). Our estimates on switching costs generally appear sensible, having correct signs and relative magnitudes. They show that …rms entering the market with a higher capacity level incur larger costs, and suggest that increasing capacity level is generally costly while a reduction can return some revenue. We …nd that operating and entry costs are generally higher after the 1990 CAAA, which supports Ryan's key …nding. We are also able to estimate the discount factor with reasonable precision.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical model and the basic modeling assumptions. Section 3 gives a joint identi…cation result on the discount factor and the payo¤ parameters with a linear speci…cation. Section 4 studies nonparametric identi…cation of the switching costs. Section 5 illustrates the performance and use of our estimator with simulated and real data. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains details for extending our identi…cation results to dynamic games.
Notations. We use (A) ; CS (A) ; A > and A y to respectively denote the rank, column space, transpose and Moore-Penrose inverse of matrix A. For any positive integers p; q, we let I p and 0 p q respectively denote the identity matrix of size p and a p q matrix of zeros.
Basic Modelling Framework
We begin by describing an in…nite time horizon dynamic discrete choice model as in Rust (1987 Rust ( , 1994 ). 4 Given our empirical examples and application below, we shall sometimes refer to our representative economic agent as a …rm and her payo¤s as pro…ts. Let t 2 f1; 2; : : : ; 1g denote time. The random variables in our model are: the action and state variables, denoted by a t and s t respectively. a t takes values from a …nite set of alternatives A = f0; 1; :
x t is public information to both the …rm and the econometrician, while " t (" t (0) ; : : :
is private information only observed by the …rm. Future states are uncertain. Today's action and states a¤ect outcomes for states in the future. The evolution of the states is summarized by a Markov transition law P (s t+1 js t ; a t ). The …rm's period payo¤ function is u (a t ; s t ) 2 R. Future period's pay-o¤s are discounted at the rate 2 [0; 1). At time t the …rms observes s t and chooses an action optimally. Speci…cally, a t (s t ) so that,
where V (s) = max a2A fu (a; s) + E [V (s t+1 ) js t = s; a t = a]g :
Using the optimal decision rule we can remove the max operator and write the value function as,
The expectation operators in the displays above integrate out variables with respect to the probability distribution induced by the equilibrium choice probabilities and Markov transition law. As standard in the literature we assume the following assumptions.
Assumption M:
(i) (Additive Separability) For all a; x; ": u (a; x; ") = (a; x) + " (a) :
(ii) (Conditional Independence) The transition distribution of the states has the following factorization for all x 0 ; " 0 ; x; "; a:
where Q is the cumulative distribution function of " t and G denotes the transition law of x t+1 conditioning on x t ; a t . Furthermore, " t has …nite …rst moments, and a positive, continuous and bounded density on R J+1 .
(iii) (Finite Observed State) X = f1; : : : ; Kg.
The primitives of the model under this setting consist of ( ; ; Q; G). Throughout the paper we shall assume (G; Q) to be known. G can be identi…ed from the data when (a t ; x t ; x t+1 ) are observed. Consistent estimation of the joint distribution of (a t ; x t ; x t+1 ) holds under weak conditions with a single time series, as well as repeated observations from short panels when there is no other unobserved heterogeneity. Q is typically assumed known in most empirical applications. Conditions for the identi…cation of Q exist using a large support type argument, e.g. see Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014, Proposition 1) and Chen (2014, Theorem 4). On the other hand our results do not depend on any continuity assumption to achieve identi…cation as we take x t to be a discrete random variable.
Our subsequent analysis will use as the starting point the fact that we can identify the choice probability from data, which in turn is informative about ( ; ). More speci…cally, for any a > 0, let v (a; x) v (a; x) v (0; x), where v (a; x) denotes the choice-speci…c value function that serves as the mean utility in a discrete choice modelling:
for all a 0 6 = a] :
By inverting the choice probabilities (Hotz and Miller (1993) ) we can recover v (a; x) for all a > 0; x.
Identifying the Discount Factor with Linear-in-Parameter

Payo¤s
In this section we assume the payo¤ function takes on a linear-in-parameter speci…cation. Section 3.1 de…nes the identi…cation concept for the discount factor and payo¤ parameters. Section 3.2 provides some representation lemmas that will be useful for de…ning a criterion function to study identi…cation. Section 3.3 gives the identi…cation result.
De…nition of Parametric Identi…cation
We will assume Assumption M and the following assumption throughout this section.
Assumption P (Linear-in-Parameter): For all a; x:
where 0 is a known real value function, 1 is a known p dimensional vector value function and belongs to R p .
Assumption P can be interpreted as nonparametric. For example it can represent an unrestricted nonparametric function of by by assigning a parameter for each pair of a and x. However, such function is too rich and cannot be identi…ed. We will maintain the parametric appearance for as we will be exploiting any nonparametric restrictions in our study on identifying the discount factor.
The role of 0 is to represent the payo¤ components that are identi…able without the knowledge of the discount factor. In practice 0 and possibly parts of 1 may have to be estimated (e.g. see Section 5.2). For the purpose of identi…cation they can be treated as known. The primitives in this setting are ( ; ). They belong to B where B = [0; 1) and = R p . We are interested in the data generating discount factor and payo¤ parameters, which we denote by 0 and 0 respectively.
We begin by de…ning the parametric choice-speci…c value function (cf. equation (3)):
v (a; x; ; )
Then we de…ne v (a; x; ; ) v (a; x; ; ) v (0; x; ; ). It is important to recall the sequence fa t ; x t ; " t g 1 t=0 in equation (4) follows an optimal controlled process consistent with ( 0 ; 0 ). Therefore, using Hotz-Miller's inversion, it follows that v (a; x; 0 ; 0 ) is identi…ed from the observed choice probabilities for all a; x.
We take each pair ( ; ) to be a structure of the empirical model and its implied choice-speci…c values, denoted by V ;
f v (a; x; ; )g a;x2A X , to be its corresponding reduced form. We then de…ne identi…cation using the notion of observational equivalence in terms of the expected payo¤s. For our identi…cation study we de…ne our statistical model to be fV ; g ; 2B . 5 It is appropriate to call fV ; g ; 2B a pseudo-model in the sense that V ; characterizes the optimal decision rule when the random variables in equation (4) follow an optimal controlled process consistent with ( 0 ; 0 ) rather than ( ; ). I.e. the reduced form of a pseudo-model comes from an economic agent solving a pseudo-decision problem. All statements made on identi…cation in Section 3 are within the context of the model described by fV ; g ; 2B .
Note that we can also de…ne a statistical model based on probability distributions as in the traditional studies of identi…cation. Speci…cally, by letting
) v (a 0 ; x; ; ) > " (a 0 ) " (a) for all a 0 6 = a]g a;x2A X :
It is known there is a one-to-one relation between fV ; g ; 2B and fP ; g ; 2B ; see Matzkin (1991), Hotz and Miller (1993) , and Norets and Takahashi (2013). Therefore identi…cation for our decision problem can be equivalently established with either fV ; g ; 2B or fP ; g ; 2B .
Some Representation Lemmas
The advantage of a pseudo-model is that V ; is mathematically tractable as a function of ( ; ).
Under Assumptions M and P, it shall be useful to separate out the contributions of the expected discounted payo¤s in (4) as follows:
v (a; x; ; ) = 0 (a;
: 5 The traditional literature on identi…cation in econometrics uses probability distributions to describe a statistical model. Let
for all a 0 6 = a]g a;x2A X :
There is in fact a one-to-one relation between fV ; g ; 2B and fP ; g ; 2B ; see Matzkin (1991) , Hotz and Miller (1993) , and Norets and Takahashi (2013). Therefore identi…cation for our decision problem can be equivalently established with either fV ; g ; 2B or fP ; g ; 2B .
Subsequently, by de…ning l (a; x) l (a; x) l (0; x) for l = 0; 1, we have:
The decomposition of v helps us distinguish how and/or a¤ect di¤erent parts of the per-period payo¤s. Lemma 1 summarizes this in a matrix form. 
where the elements in the above display are collected and explained in Tables A and B .
Matrix Dimension Representing
Table A. The matrices consist of (di¤erences in) expected payo¤s and probabilities. The latter represent conditional expectations for any function of x t+1 .
Vector Representing Proof: This is a special case of Lemma R in Sanches et al. (2016) . Tables A and B are either known or estimable from the choice and transitional probabilities. The tables will serve as a useful reference for constructing the necessary components we use for de…ning the criterion function in Section 3.3.
All vectors and matrices in
Given that we can identify v a ( 0 ; 0 ) for all a > 0, to identify ( 0 ; 0 ), it is su¢ cient to show that for all ( ;
Our next lemma provides a characterization as to how changing and can a¤ect v a .
Lemma 2:
Under Assumptions M and P, for any a > 0 and ( ; )
Proof: Follows from some algebra based on equation (5).
Lemma 2 illustrates the nature of the identi…cation problem we have at hand. We highlight the following particulars:
(i) If the discount rate is assumed to be known, from (6), a su¢ cient condition for v a ( 0 ; ) 6 = v a ( 0 ; 0 ) when 6 = 0 is that R a 1 + H a (I K L) 1 R 1 has full column rank for some a > 0.
(ii) If the payo¤ function is assumed to be known, from (7), a su¢ cient condition for v a ( 0 ; 0 ) 6 = v a ( ; 0 ) when 6 = 0 is that (R 0 + R 1 0 + ) 6 = 0 and H a is invertible some a > 0.
(iii) Suppose p is large relative to K. Then for any a > 0 such that R a 1 + H a (I K L) 1 R 1 has rank K, and for any 0 ; 6 = 0 that v a ( 0 ; 0 ) 6 = v a ( ; 0 ), by equating (6) and (7), we can always …nd such that v a ( 0 ; 0 ) = v a ( ; ).
Point (i) shows that su¢ cient conditions for identi…cation of the payo¤ parameters when the discount rate is assumed known can be easily stated and veri…ed. More generally the su¢ cient condition for the identi…cation of the payo¤ parameter can be stated in terms of the full column rank of the matrix that stacks together R a 1 + H a (I K L) 1 R 1 over a. In the case we are able to identify the payo¤ function outside of the dynamic model, (ii) shows that the discount factor can also be identi…ed and provide one type of su¢ cient conditions that can be readily checked. Point (iii)
shares the intuition along the line of Manski (1993) that when the parameterization on the payo¤ function is too rich, ( ; ) may not identi…able in B .
From Lemma 2, it is also apparent that we should be able to identify ( 0 ; 0 ) jointly when the change in the vector of expected payo¤s from altering the discount factor moves in a di¤erent direction to the change caused by altering the payo¤ parameters.
Sum of Squares Criterion Function
The study of identi…cation involving the discount factor is complicated due to the fact that V ; is nonlinear in ( ; ). However, for a given , we can see from (5) that V ; is linear in . We use pro…ling to exploit the conditional linearity to simplify the identi…cation problem for a nonlinear model with p + 1 parameters to a one-dimensional problem.
Then we can write, using (5):
It is clear that m a ( ; ) is linear in for any given . We can stack together the system of equations above across a. In doing so we obtain the following vector value function, m : B ! R KJ :
where a ( ) is a KJ 1 vector and B ( ) is a KJ p matrix.
Let M ( ; ) km ( ; )k, i.e. M ( ; ) is the Euclidean norm of m ( ; ). Then by construction,
and any other ( ; ) such that M ( ; ) = 0 is observationally equivalent to ( 0 ; 0 ) by the property of the norm. Therefore M has the necessary property to serve as a criterion for identi…cation.
Next we pro…le out in order to reduce the dimensionality on M by exploiting its least squares structure. For each , run a regression of a ( ) on B ( ), we can de…ne:
So that ( ) is a least squares solution to min 2 M ( ; ). Then we de…ne:
By construction it also holds that
In this way we have reduced the parameter space in the identi…cation problem to a one-dimensional one. Furthermore the domain of the parameter space is on a small interval: [0; 1). The reasoning is analogous to pro…ling in an estimation routine. Particularly we can ignore any that does not lie in arg min 2 M ( ; ) since necessarily, and B ( 0 ) has full column rank.
Proof: 
Comments on Theorem 1:
(i) High Level Assumptions. Conditions in Theorem 1 are high level as we do not relate them to the underlying primitives of the model. However, they are statements made on objects that are observed or can be consistently estimated nonparametrically. In the Appendix we give a more detailed conditions for M to have a unique minimum.
(ii) Feasible Check and Estimation. Since we have reduced the identi…cation problem to a singleparameter that can reside only in a narrow range, there is no need to refer to complicated results for the identi…cation of a general nonlinear model. We can use the sample parts of components in Tables A and B By inspecting of the proof of Theorem 1 it is clear there are some separation between the identi-…ability of 0 and 0 . In particular we have de…ned ( ) using a generalized inverse of the matrix B ( ) > B ( ). Therefore 0 can be identi…ed even if 0 is not.
The full rank condition on B ( 0 ) is not an innocuous assumption when we view Assumption P as a representation of a nonparametric function. In practice this is often delivered by an exclusion assumption or more generally normalization of certain payo¤ parameters. Next section we will focus on payo¤ parameters that we call switching costs. We will revisit the question of identi…ability of the discount factor under di¤erent normalization choice in Section 4.3.
Nonparametric Identi…cation of Switching Costs
In this section we consider payo¤ functions under nonparametric restrictions that allow us to obtain closed-form expressions for the switching costs parameters. In Section 4.1 we de…ne a switching cost function and explain the assumptions required for our identi…cation result. Section 4.2 gives the identi…cation result. Section 4.3 relates the identi…cation of the discount factor under Assumption P to models with switching costs.
Switching Costs
The payo¤ function cannot be nonparametrically identi…ed without any restrictions. Economic theory can help guide how to impose structures on the payo¤ function. A main consideration in making a dynamic discrete decision is how a change in one's action from the previous period immediately a¤ect today's payo¤s. Actions from the past are therefore often important components of the state variables.
In order to highlight the role of switching costs we distinguish past actions from other state variables. At time t we denote actions from the previous period by w t , so that w t a t 1 . We denote the switching cost from changing action from w to a by SC w!a . Subsequently, in this section we shall maintain an updated version of Assumption M where x t is replaced with (w t ; x t ) everywhere.
In addition we impose the following assumptions. (ii) (Conditional Independence): The distribution of x t+1 conditional on a t and x t is independent
The decomposition of in N(i) may appear peculiar but it is typical in many empirical IO applications. We will give an interpretation of its components in the context of an IO model. The de…ning feature of is that it excludes past actions. can represent the …rm's operational pro…t in the current period, such as variable pro…ts and operational costs, which does not depend on actions from the past. is the switching cost function that takes non-zero values only when a change of action occurs. Note that, by construction, we have
where 1 [ ] denotes the indicator function.
Assumption N(ii) imposes that knowing actions from the past does not help predict future state variables when the present action and other observable state variables are known. Note that N(ii) is not implied by M(ii). In many applications fx t g is simply assumed to be a strictly exogenous …rst order Markov process. Speci…cally this implies x t+1 is independent of a t conditional on x t in addition to N(ii). In any case, unlike M(ii), N(ii) is a restriction made on the observables so it can be tested directly from the data. Later we shall show how x t can be modi…ed to contain past actions so N(ii)
can be weakened to allow for dependence of other state variables with past actions.
Even under Assumption N(i) identi…cation issue persists (e.g. see the discussion in Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014)). SC w!a cannot be identi…ed for all w 6 = a without any further restrictions. Some of their di¤erences can be identi…ed. For example identi…cation is possible if we normalize some baseline switching costs to be known. We will look at di¤erent restrictions that can be used to identify individual or combination of the switching costs. Before giving the formal result we provide an intuition as to why Assumption N is helpful for identifying the switching costs, and illustrate the key steps of our identi…cation strategy.
Exclusion and Independence Restrictions
Consider a two-period entry/exit decision problem. Let A = f0; 1g, where 0 denotes exit and 1 denotes entry. Then SC 0!1 and SC 1!0 respectively have interpretations of entry cost and scrap value. In this case we can write
The choice-speci…c value function (cf. (3)) in this model is:
. At time t, a …rm will enter if and only if (w; x) > " t (0) " t (1). We can identify from the observed choice probabilities.
The role of our assumptions is to isolate today's switching costs from the remaining components in the choice-speci…c value function. Speci…cally, we apply N(i) to decompose the pro…t function in the current period and use N(ii) to simplify the expected future pro…ts. We can then re-write the equation above as
Crucially note that the conditional expectation on future pro…ts in no longer depends on w t under N(ii) by the law of iterated expectation. We treat as a nuisance parameter; it is a nonparametric object that depends on all primitives in the model. Let
Using equation (10) we have,
It is now clear we can identify a combination of the switching costs by di¤erencing out in the equation above:
In an entry/exit game the quantity SC 0!1 SC 1!0 represents the sunk entry cost that a …rm cannot recover back once it decides to leave the market after entering. Equation (12) shows the sunk entry cost can be identi…ed independently of and . On the other hand it is well known that entry cost and scrap value cannot be nonparametrically identi…ed separately in this particular model. In an empirical work an unidenti…ed object gets normalized. It is clear from equation (12) that either the entry cost or scrap value can be identi…ed if other parameter is assumed to be known.
For example, a common assumption is to normalize the scrap value to be zero, the entry cost can be estimated conditionally on this value along with the other parameters.
The identi…cation strategy above can be generalized substantially. Results for a more general decision model under M and N can be obtained with little modi…cation. The extension to dynamic games is more complex. It requires more notations and the notion of a di¤erence generalizes to projection of a matrix. We defer these details to the Appendix.
Closed-Form Identi…cation
We start by providing an expression for the di¤erences in choice-speci…c valuations that generalizes equation (11) . For any a > 0, let v (a; w;
and (a; w; x) (a w; w; x) ( w; w; x). Lemma 3 generalizes equation (11) . 
where
Proof: Using the law of iterated expectation, the value function as de…ned in equation (2),
can be simpli…ed further to E [ e m (a t ; x t ) ja t ; x t ] after another application of the law of iterated expectation and imposing N(ii). The remainder of the proof then follows from the de…nitions of the terms de…ned in the text.
Components of v are and . We treat as a nuisance parameter. contains the switching costs of interest, for any a; w; x:
As seen previously we can identify di¤erences in by eliminating . This can be done by looking at di¤erences of v (a; w; x) across di¤erent w while holding (a; x) …xed. 
Theorem 2 follows immediately from Lemma 3. Equation (15) tells us that we can always identify some combinations of the switching costs nonparametrically. Importantly the identi…ed objects do not depend on or .
Comments on Theorem 2.
(i) Certain di¤erences in in equation (15) are economically meaningful. For example we have already introduced the sunk entry cost in the entry/exit model. The notion of sunk costs naturally generalizes when there is a varying degree of commitment. More speci…cally consider an investment or capacity game where it costs a …rm to choose a t > a t 1 , and conversely a …rm can divest to recover some of these costs by choosing a t < a t 1 . In this case SC a 0 !a SC a!a 0 with a > a 0 represents a sunk investment cost for a …rm that increases its investment level from a 0 to a, and divest back to a 0 . Using equations (14) and (15) (ii) We would prefer to identify the switching costs individually. However, without further information, they are not identi…ed nonparametrically for this type of models; for example see Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014) for a thorough discussion. But identi…cation can be achieved if we are willing to impose some constraints on the switching costs. One example is by assuming symmetry of switching costs between any two actions, which would be reasonable in applications with logistical or physical adjustment costs such as the traditional menu costs (e.g. see Slade (1998) 
It is important to highlight that assigning incorrect values to 0 generally leads to incorrect values of SC w!a . However, it is easy to verify that certain combinations of switching costs, including those in Corollaries 1 and 2, are robust against any choice of 0 .
(iv) Generally Corollaries 1 and 2 can be informative on the validity of a particular normalization choice since they themselves are derived without normalization. For example, let us go back to the discussion on investment game at the end of our …rst comment where there is a divestment opportunity. In this context it would be natural to assume that SC a 0 !a SC a!a 0 = c 0 > 0 when a > a 0 . Then, given both SC a 0 !a and SC a!a 0 are positive, it must be the case that SC a 0 !a is bounded below by c 0 . 
Identi…cation and Normalization
We have emphasized that normalizations of switching costs are necessary in many situations. The validity of the identi…cation of payo¤ parameters can depend directly on the normalization choice. Now we study the e¤ect of normalizations on the identi…cation of the discount factor.
In the empirical IO literature the discount factor is customarily assumed to be known while the focus on identi…cation falls on which payo¤ parameters can (or cannot) be identi…ed. A particular normalization choice is made by assigning a value to an unknown parameter as previously explained.
The normalization assumption is made independent to the choice of the discount factor. The non-identi…ability of the payo¤ parameters considered in practice therefore mathematically translates to the matrix B ( ) in equation (8) being rank de…cient for all . For our result, we only need to consider rank de…ciency at 0 .
Recall that B ( 0 ) is a KJ p matrix. Suppose (B ( 0 )) = r < p. I.e. the rank condition in Theorem 1 fails. Then without any loss of generality we can write:
where B 1 is a matrix consisting of the …rst r columns of B ( 0 ) such that CS (B 1 ) = CS (B ( 0 )), and B 2 is a matrix containing the last (p r) columns of B ( 0 ). Since CS (B 2 ) CS (B 1 ) there exists an r (p r) matrix such that B 2 = B 1 . (8), where we de…ne m ( ; ) = a ( ) B ( ) to study identi…cation. By construction m ( 0 ; 0 ) = 0, which implies a ( 0 ) = B ( 0 ) 0 . Let 01 and 02 respectively denote column vectors containing the …rst r elements and the last (p r) elements of 0 . Then it is easy to verify that for any e 2 2 R p r we can construct e 1 2 R r such that,
Now recall equation
by setting e 1 = 01 + ( 02 e 2 )):
I.e. ( 0 ; 0 ) and ( 0 ; e ), where e = [ e > 1 : e > 2 ] > , are observationally equivalent. Therefore: if the discount factor can be identi…ed, it can be identi…ed for all normalization choices. Our argument can be straightforwardly extended to other normalization types (e.g. by assigning a value to a combination of parameters) using basic linear algebra. An equivalent way to state this result is given in the following proposition. The discount factor can therefore be identi…ed independently of the normalization choice on switching costs. Our discussion here also leads to another empirical fact that may not be obvious a priori.
Suppose a particular is chosen and it satis…es both P and N. Then there are two di¤erent ways to estimate the switching costs based on our parametric and nonparametric identi…cation approaches.
We have shown some combinations of the switching costs can be identi…ed without any normalization using the nonparametric approach. We are interested to know if the parametric approach in Section 3 that relies on a possibly incorrect normalization choice can consistently estimate these combinations.
The answer is positive. Consider any combination of the switching costs, which can be written explicitly in terms of the di¤erences in choice-speci…c valuations (e.g. sunk costs, see Corollaries 1
and 2). A vector of such combinations can be represented by a 0 for some matrix . Then for any e such that ( 0 ; e ) is observationally equivalent to ( 0 ; 0 ) we also have a 0 = B ( 0 ) 0 = B ( 0 ) e .
I.e. the combinations of switching costs described by B ( 0 ) identify the same objects.
Numerical Illustration
We illustrate the use of our identi…cation strategies and implement the suggested estimators in the previous sections. Section 5.1 gives results from a Monte Carlo study taken from Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008). Section 5.2 estimates a discrete investment game using the data from Ryan (2012).
Monte Carlo Study
The simulation design is the two-…rm dynamic entry game taken from Section 7 in Pesendorfer and
Schmidt-Dengler (2008). In period t each …rm i has two possible choices, a it 2 f0; 1g, with a it = 1 denoting entry. The only observed state variables are previous period's actions, w t = (a 1t 1 ; a 2t 1 ).
Using their notation, …rm 1 0 s period payo¤s are described as follows: The model satis…es both Assumptions MN and MP in the Appendix. We consider two estimation methods. Method A pro…les out all the payo¤ parameters using the OLS expression and use grid search to estimate the discount factor. Method B …rst estimates the entry cost in closed-form independently before pro…ling out the other payo¤ parameters and use grid search to estimate the discount factor. We are also interested to see how sensitive our estimates are with respect to the normalization choice.
For each equilibrium we perform 10000 simulations with sample sizes N = 100; 1000; 10000. Since the entry cost and scrap value cannot be jointly identi…ed we estimate the model under di¤erent normalized values for W . We report: the bias and standard deviation (in italics) for
and the sunk entry cost ( \ SU N K); we use the bold font to highlight the statistics that correspond to the correctly assumed choice of W . We estimate the sunk entry cost for Methods A and B by …rst estimating the entry cost and combine it with the assumed scrap value. In addition we also estimate the sunk entry cost without normalizing the scrap value according to Example 1 in the Appendix (also see Corollary 1). We label the columns of statistics for the sunk entry estimator with no normalization by N-N. Tables 1-3 
Empirical Illustration
We estimate a simpli…ed version of an entry-investment game based on the model studied in Ryan (2012) using his data. In what follows we provide a brief description of the data, highlight the main di¤erences between the game we model and estimate with that of Ryan (2012) . Then we present and discuss our estimates of the primitives.
Data
We download Ryan's data from the Econometrica webpage. 6 There are two sets of data. One contains aggregate prices and quantities for all the US regional markets from the US Geological by di¤erent …rms. We observe that plants' names and ownerships change frequently. This can be due to either mergers and acquisitions or to simple changes in the company name. We do not treat these changes as entry/exit movements. We check each observation in the sample using the kiln information (fuel type, process type, year of installation and plant location) installed in the plant. If a plant changes its name but keeps the same kiln characteristics, we assume that the name change is not associated to any entry/exit movement. This way of preparing the data enables us to match most of the summary statistics of plant-level data in Table 2 of Ryan. Any discrepancies most likely can be attributed to the way we treat the change in plants'names, which may di¤er to Ryan in a very small number of cases.
Dynamic Game
Ryan models a dynamic game played between …rms that own cement plants in order to measure the welfare costs of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (1990 CAAA) on the US Portland cement industry. The decision for each …rm is …rst whether to enter (or remain in) the market or exit, and if it is active in the market then how much to invest or divest. Firm's investment decisions is governed by its capacity level. The …rm's pro…t is determined by variable payo¤s from the competition in the product market with other …rms, as well as switching costs from the entry and investment/divestment decisions. There are two action variables in Ryan's model. One is a binary choice for entry and the other is a continuous level of investment. Past actions are the only observed endogenous state variables in the game. The aggregate data that are used to construct variable pro…ts, through a static Cournot game with capacity constraints between …rms, are treated as exogenous.
We consider a discrete game that extends the single agent model in the paper as described in the Appendix. The main departure from Ryan (2012) is that we combine the entry decision along with the capacity level into a single discrete variable. We set the action space to be an ordinal set f0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5g, where 0 represents exit/inactive, and the positive integers are ordered to denote entry/active with di¤erent capacity levels. The payo¤ for each …rm has two additive separable components. One depends on the observables while the other is an unobserved shock. The observable component can be broken down into variable pro…ts, operating cost and switching costs. We assume the variable pro…t is determined by the players competing in a capacity constrained Cournot game.
The operating cost is a …xed pro…t that incurs when a it > 0. The switching costs capture the essence of …rms'entry and investment decisions. Lastly each …rm receives unobserved pro…t shocks for each action with a standard i.i.d. type-1 extreme value distribution.
Estimation
The period expected payo¤ for each …rm as a function of the observables consists of variable pro…ts, operating costs and switching costs. The variable pro…t is derived from a capacity constrained Cournot game constructed from the same demand and cost functions estimated as in Ryan's paper.
The operating and switching costs parameters enter the payo¤ function additively and are parameters to be estimated using the dynamic model. These operating cost is non-zero whenever a it > 0. For the switching costs we normalize the payo¤ for choosing action 0 to be zero. There are a total of 25 switching cost parameters to be estimated. 7 The payo¤ function in our empirical model satis…es Assumptions MN and MP in the Appendix.
So we estimate the model using Methods A and B as described in Section 5.1. We also test if the two estimates of the switching costs statistically di¤er. Instead of using nonparametric estimator, similar to Ryan, we use a multinomial logit to estimate the choice and transition probabilities in the …rst stage. More speci…cally, method A pro…les out the 26 linear coe¢ cients and uses grid search to estimate the discount factor. Method B …rst estimates the 25 switching cost parameters in closed-form using the closed-form expression in Section 4, treat them as known, before pro…ling and performing the grid search. We also estimate the sunk entry and investment values based on the estimates from Methods A and B, as well as nonparametrically without normalization (cf. Corollaries 7 Ryan (2012) models the switching costs di¤erently. The …xed operating cost is normalized to be zero. Non-zero investment and divestment costs are drawn from two distinct independent normal distributions, whose means and variances are estimated using the methodology in Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007). 1 and 2, and see the discussion in the Appendix).
We estimate the standard errors, as well as computing the p-value of the Wald statistics to test if the switching costs estimators from methods A and B di¤er by bootstrapping. Our bootstrap sample is generated using the multinomial logit choice and transition probabilities for each player in each market in the same manner as a parametric bootstrap; cf. Kasahara and Shimotsu (2008) and Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2007) . We use 500 bootstrap samples and report the standard errors in italics.
Results
We estimate the model twice. Once using the data from before and after the implementation of the 1990 CAAA. We assume for illustrational purposes the data are generated from di¤erent equilibria over the two time periods, but the same equilibrium is played in all markets within each time period and there is no other source of unobserved heterogeneity. 8 Table 4 and 5 compile the results from estimating switching costs using the data from the years 1980 to 1990 and 1991 to 1998 respectively. Tables 6 and 7 give the estimates for the discount factor and …xed operating cost using the data from the corresponding periods. Table 8 compares the estimates of the sunk entry costs and sunk investment costs.
The signs and relative magnitudes of individually estimated switching costs almost uniformly make sensible economic sense. E.g., by reading down the columns in Tables 4 and 5 , we see that entering at higher capacity level generally implies higher cost (negative payo¤), and increasing the capacity level should be costly while divestment can return revenue for …rms. This is quite an impressive …nding in particular for Method B, which shows that the observed probabilities alone can generate switching costs estimates that capture reasonably well a key feature of a complicated structural model. The switching cost estimates from both Methods A and B are similar. The Wald statistics do not …nd the two switching costs estimators to be statistically di¤erent. 9 Therefore we do not reject the capacity constrained Cournot game speci…cation based on comparing the switching costs estimates. Comparing Tables 4 and 5 shows the entry and switching costs increase after the implementation of 1990 CAAA. Higher entry costs is a key …nding in Ryan's paper as new entrants face more stringent regulations than incumbents. An increase in switching costs can be partly attributed to the new plants using newer (or better maintained) equipment that require more certi…cation and testing than previously.
We …nd the discount factor to be around the range that are usually used (between 0.9 and 0.95) apart from the estimate using Method B before the 1990 CAAA that appears close to the boundary. 10 Although our estimates suggest …rms face a lower borrowing rate than in Ryan, we do not reject the hypothesis that = 0:9 as assumed in his paper. We also …nd a small increase in the …xed operating costs after the implementation of 1990 CAAA.
Finally Table 8 reports sunk costs using di¤erent estimation methods. The estimates from Methods A and B can be found by computing SC a 0 !a SC a!a 0 using individual switching costs in Tables   4 and 5 . The N-N approach estimates the same object without the assumption that the payo¤ is zero upon choosing action 0. The signs and magnitudes of the sunk cost estimates are plausible. We …nd the sunk investment costs between any two capacity levels increase as the gap between levels grow, while we …nd the costs to be of similar magnitude when compared within the same capacity di¤erence bands. We also …nd the sunk costs to have increased after the implementation of 1990 CAAA. 10 The in…nite time expected discounted payo¤s with respect to each action is unbounded with = 1. However, the di¤erences between diverge very slowly when we approximate them with a Neumann sum, and the objective function appears to be well-de…ned numerically even as is very close to 1.
Method A
a it 1 = 0 a it 1 = 1 a it 1 = 2 a it 1 = 3 a it 1 = 4 a it 1 = 5 
Concluding Remarks
We show the discount factor can be identi…ed jointly with the payo¤ function under the linear-inparameter speci…cation. The key property we exploit is the conditional linearity of the choice-speci…c value functions for a given value of the discount factor. The discount factor can in fact be identi…ed even if the payo¤ parameters cannot be identi…ed. This has an important implication since many empirical problems have to normalize parts of the payo¤ parameters. Our result shows the discount factor can be identi…ed independently of these normalization choices.
We also contribute to recent interest in the robust identi…cation of combination of switching costs without any normalization as studied in Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014) ; also see Kalouptsidi, Scott and Souza-Rodrigues (2016a, 2016b). We provide closed-form identi…cation results independently of the discount factor and other parts of the payo¤ function. We show some costs, such as sunk entry and investment costs, can be identi…ed without any normalization and, for linear models, even when an incorrect normalization is used.
We have shown our parametric and nonparametric identi…cation approaches can deliver substantially di¤erent ( ‡avors of) results. But there is a considerable overlap in practice when it comes to estimating the switching costs as a payo¤ function can satisfy both P and N(i). However, there are notable implications for our nonparametric results that extend beyond the linear model. First, a researcher may want to use a nonlinear parametric speci…cation on parts of the payo¤s; for example to impose positivity. Second, our nonparametric identi…cation result is valid pointwise for each observed state, therefore it is immediately applicable to models with continuous states; e.g. see Srisuma and Linton (2012) . In these cases Assumption P has no implication on our nonparametric identi…cation results.
Finally our main message is that one should generally attempt to identify and estimate the discount factor in dynamic decision problems and games. Clearly we do not expect the linear speci…cation to be necessary for identi…cation, but an analysis with nonlinear a parametric payo¤ function will be substantially more di¢ cult. Similarly, outside of discrete choice models, e.g. for games with supermodular payo¤ functions (see Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) and Srisuma (2013)), joint identi…cation and estimation of the discount factor and payo¤ parameters should also be possible.
However, the practical implementation can be burdensome since there is no obvious way to reduce the parameter space even when the payo¤ functions take a linear-in-parameter structure.
The Appendix has two parts. A.1 extends the results on identi…cation of switching costs to dynamic games. A.2 provides a high level su¢ cient condition for the identi…cation of the discount factor.
Since the single agent decision problem is a special case of a game, we also present the results in A.2 in the context of a game.
A.1 Identi…cation of the Switching Costs in Dynamic Games
We shall keep our description of the basic elements of the game very brief. The notation we use directly extends what we describe in Sections 2 and 3. Consider a game with I players, indexed by i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ig. The random variables in the game are the actions: a t (a it ; a it ) 2 A I ,
, where X = f1; : : : ; Kg, and " it (" it (0) ; : : : ; " it (J)) 2 R J+1 ; and we let s t (w t ; x t ; " 1t ; : : : ; " It ).
In an equilibrium a it = i (s it ) for all i, such that
where u i and V i are player i's payo¤ and value function respectively; in particular
Assumption MN updates Assumptions M and N for games.
Assumption MN:
(i) (Additive Separability) For all a i ; a i ; w; x; " i : u i (a i ; a i ; w; x; " i ) = i (a i ; a i ; w; x) + " i (a i ) :
(ii) (Conditional Independence I) The transition distribution of the states has the following factorization for all x 0 ; " 0 ; x; "; a:
where Q i is the cumulative distribution function of " it and G denotes the transition law of costs that occur for each player are determined by her own actions. It will be useful to sometimes represent the switching cost using a more intuitive notation (cf. equation (9)):
Proof: Follows immediately from applying the law of iterated expectations (cf. the proof of Lemma 1).
Since we have …nite actions and states, we can collect v i (a i ; w; x) across w for each (i; a i ; x)
into a vector of size (J + 1) I . Using a matrix form, we have:
represents the matrix of conditional probabilities for computing a conditional expectation of a it given (w t = w; x t = x), 
where e P = I`1 e Z( e Z > e Z) y e Z > .
Before presenting the proof to Theorem 3 some explanations on the notations will be useful.
The crucial interpretation of our result rests on the relation: DQ i (a i ; x) i = e Q e + 0 . The goal of Theorem 3 is to identify components, or combinations, of ( i (a i ; w; x)) w2A I using choice-speci…c value functions in equation (19) for a given (i; a i ; x). We denote the object of interest by e . We use 0 to account for components of switching costs that can be identi…ed outside the dynamic model from the data or by normalization. Therefore (D; e Q) are user-chosen matrices and are known. We can also treat e Z i as known since Z i (x) is a matrix of observed choice probabilities.
Proof of Theorem 3.
Note that`3 1 since`2 minf`1; (Z i (x))g and (Z i (x)) (J + 1) I 1 . Multiply equation (19) by D yields,
By assumption, e P e Q has full column rank. The result then follows from projecting v i (a i ; x) orthogonally onto the null space of e Z and solve out for e i .
One systematic approach to apply Theorem 3 in practice is to …rst write out the matrix equation (19) . Then choose D so that DQ i (a i ; x) i contains the switching costs of interest, and de…ne e Q e + 0 appropriately. We now illustrate this identifying strategy with a two-player binary choice game for di¤erent types of switching costs.
For notational compactness we will suppress x t and assume that SC w!a i (w i ) is the same for all w i . We use
. Then equation (19) represents: 2 "
In particular we have The sunk entry cost can then be identi…ed by the expression in equation (20) . ; e = SC 0!1 i , and 0 = In order to obtain the sunk costs when the number of actions is larger than two one has to combine identi…able objects across actions, e.g. see Corollary 2. Identi…cation of objects for each action can be obtained as the examples above have shown. We use Theorem 3 to estimate the games such as those in our simulation study and the empirical model of capacity game in Section 5 of our paper.
A.2 A Su¢ cient Condition for Identi…cation of the Discount Factor
In this part of the appendix we attempt to give a more analytical approach that ensures identi…cation of the discount factor and payo¤ parameters in a dynamic game context. We …rst introduce some additional notations.
For any x = (x 1 ; : : : ; x p ) > 2 R p and y = (y 1 ; : : : ; y p+1 ) > 2 R p+1 , let kxk 1 = max i=1;:::;p jx i j and kyk 2 = max i=1;:::;p jy i j + jy p+1 j. Then for a class of p + 1 by p real matrices, we denote the matrix norms induced by k k 1 ; k k 2 by k k 1 ; 2 . We comment that these are not standard induced matrix norms, however they have simple explicit bounds. In particular it is easy to verify that, for any matrix p + 1 by p, C = (c ij ),
We also need the parameter space to be compact. Let 2 : max i=1;:::;p j i j k and B 0; b for some positive k and b 2 (0; 1).
Next we generalize the setup of Section 4 to dynamic games. The following is a straightforward extension of Assumptions M and P.
Assumption MP:
(i) (Additive Separability) For all a i ; a i ; x; " i : u i (a i ; a i ; x; " i ; ) = i (a i ; a i ; x; ) + " i (a i ) :
where Q i is the cumulative distribution function of " it and G denotes the transition law of x t+1 conditioning on x t ; a t . Furthermore, " it has …nite …rst moments, and a positive, continuous and bounded density on R J+1 .
(iv) (Linear-in-Parameters): For all a i ; a i ; x; " i : i (a i ; a i ; x; ) = i0 (a i ; a i ; x) + > i1 (a i ; a i ; x) ;
where i0 is a known real value function, i1 is a known p dimensional vector value function and belongs to R p .
Our analysis will be based on the parameterized choice-speci…c value function: Let v i (a i ; x; ; ) v i (a i ; x; ; ) v i (0; x; ; ). We can use v i from all players to de…ne the pseudo-model and the corresponding notion of identi…cation and observationally equivalence as in Section 4. We will omit this discussion to avoid repetition.
Our starting point will be the following lemma that generalizes Lemma 2.
Lemma 5: Under Assumption MP, we have for all i; a i > 0, v a i i ( ; ) ( v i (a i ; x; ; )) x2X can collected in the following vector form for all ( ; ) 2 B
:
where the elements in the above display are collected and explained in Tables C and D.
Matrix Dimension Representing
Table C. The matrices consist of (di¤erences in) expected payo¤s and probabilities. The latter represent conditional expectations for any function of x t+1 .
Vector
Representing Our strategy to show identi…cation is to re-write Lemma 5 to set up a map that de…nes the data generating parameter as its …xed-point. One desired relation is the following. 
for all i; a i > 0, where
Proof: Equation (23) is obtained by re-arranging equation (22), after applying the identity that (I K L) 1 = I K + L (I K L) 1 and replace v a i i ( ; ) by v a i i ( 0 ; 0 ). Therefore, by construction, ( ; ) satis…es (22) if and only if it is observationally equivalent to ( 0 ; 0 ).
The following result provides one condition that is su¢ cient for the identi…cation of ( 0 ; 0 ).
Theorem 4: Assume that K p + 1 and Assumption MP holds. Suppose there exists i; a i such that: (i) the rank of F a i i is p + 1; (ii) there exists a p + 1 by K matrix A 0 such that A 0 F a i i is non-singular; and (iii) max fg 1 ; g 2 g < 1, where
Then ( 0 ; 0 ) is identi…able.
Proof: First de…ne Q a i i : [0; 1] k ! R p+1 as follows:
By construction, from (23), it is easy to see that ( 0 ; 0 ) is a …xed-point of Q. Take any ( ; ) ; ( 0 ; 0 ) 2 B , then
which can be shown by making use of the following identities:
It then follows that
I.e. Q a i i is a contraction, hence it has a unique …xed point. Now suppose ( 0 ; 0 ) is not identi…able. Then there exists some ( ; ) 6 = ( 0 ; 0 ) that is observationally equivalent to ( 0 ; 0 ). By an implication of Lemma 6 ( ; ) must also be a …xed point of Q a i i , which is a contradiction. Thus ( 0 ; 0 ) is identi…able.
Comments on Theorem 4:
(i) Compact Domain. B cannot include 1 as the expected discounted returns would then be unbounded. Compactness is useful for showing existence of a …xed point. There is also a trade-o¤ in the choice of b and k in the de…nitions of B and respectively. For example, smaller b and k means smaller max fg 1 ; g 2 g but this is a restriction on the parameter space.
(ii) Choice of A 0 . The need to select A 0 can be eliminated altogether by removing some rows in (23) so that we have exactly p + 1 equations. In fact it is not necessary to take equations that only correspond to the states from a particular player i and a i . Since the parametric structure in (23) is the same for all states we can select any p + 1 equations from any i and a i and compute the corresponding matrix norms for g 1 and g 2 . This gives us di¤erent combinations of equations we can use, and we only need the analog of max fg 1 ; g 2 g to be less than 1 for one of them to ensure ( 0 ; 0 ) is identi…able.
(iii) Rank De…ciency. We have seen that sometimes not all components of the payo¤ functions can be identi…ed. For example in the entry/exit game generally the entry cost and scrap value cannot be jointly identi…ed. Then one may consider normalizing, say, the scrap value in order to estimate all the other parameters in the model. If the normalized value is incorrect one may expect that identi…cation of the parameters of interest will not be possible since the model is misspeci…ed.
Yet, our simulation study suggests the discount factor can be consistently estimated while all other pro…t parameters are biased when an incorrect scrap value is assumed. We can also relax condition (i) in Theorem 4 in this direction and allow F a i i to be rank de…cient. In particular, recall from (23) that F a i i = [ R a i i1 : H a i i (R i0 + i )], we can allow R a i i1 to be rank de…cient. In such case there exists a full rank matrix W such that R a i i1 W = [ e R a i i1 : 0] where e R a i i1 has full column rank; e.g. this is a consequence of Theorem 6.2.4 in Mirsky (1955) . Then F a i i ! in (23) becomes h e R a i i1 : 0 :
. Therefore, by inspection, the proof of Theorem 4 can be readily adapted by reparameterizing to show the identi…cation of the discount factor is possible.
